Category Archives: Strategy & Tactics

The Need For Speed…

11 Saturday Oct 2014

Posted by in 1777 Charleville, Black Powder, Black Powder Firearms, Musket, Strategy & Tactics, Weapons of the Revolution

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“Rapid Fire” and “Musket” are words that you do not normally see together. For the sake of a challenge, I’ve been working into my Saturday shoots a “speed round”, where I see how many shots I can get off in a minute. So far only two I am sad to say, but I am creeping closer to three the more I practice.

The rate of fire for muskets is generally believed to be two to maybe four shots a minute. The best rapid fire I’ve seen to date is this guy:

One primary thing to point out here. He does NOT have bullets in the cartridge. My experience its that you can’t throw a ball in the cartridge THAT fast down the barrel. The ramrod is called a ramrod because there is ramming involved. It takes a little more than just gravity to work to get a ball down the barrel.

Reloading

I’m the tall guy here…

Keeping this in mind,  I’ve reduced the ball size so I can more rapidly seat the bullet in the barrel. This means that I can leave the bullet in the cartridge without fear of jamming. I’ve moved from my standard .69 cal to my pistol cal of .57. This reduces my accuracy but increases my rate of fire.

Now back to the video. I am IMPRESSED with his ability to rapidly return the ramrod back into the musket. This by far is my most challenging aspect of rapid fire. The hole is small, and if you rush it, you just burn seconds. Why return the ramrod you ask? If you leave it behind during a battle, then all you are left with is a fancy Pike. 18th Century soldiers were trained to return the ramrod.

Tomorrow I will try my hand at rapid fire once again.

Some other notes:

  • I start with an unloaded musket.  I am not sure if the first shot of a pre-loaded musket would count toward the rate of fire. Please comment below if you know.
  • I am leaving the bayonet off for this exercise. I have left it on in the past. The blade actually does help guide my loading, but inevitably I end up cutting my hand. Its just not worth it. I use a mouse for a living–I  know, First World Problems.
  • I’ll try to get some video tomorrow.

Improving my rate of fire will take time.  Like any sport, it is really all about muscle memory and focus. Eventually I want to be able to make a video with proof of three shots a minute. Maybe I’ll actually hit the target, but lets just focus on one thing at a time shall we?

Update

Here is a clip of me fidgeting around a bit. Obviously still work to be done here:

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Shot four times. Hit paper twice at 50 yards. Again, this was with a smaller calibre, so accuracy was not the goal.

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This was my grouping at 50 yards after taking my time and using .69 calibre bullets.

Was Gettysburg the South’s Waterloo?

15 Sunday Dec 2013

Posted by in Daniel Morgan, Gettysburg, Napoleon Bonaparte, Revolutionary War, Strategy & Tactics, Waterloo

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Allen Guelzo’s sermon style talk on Gettysburg and its meaning is both thorough and entertaining. Guelzo convincingly argues that had Robert E. Lee won the battle, the South would of marched into Washington and forced peace negotiations and Southern independence. Yet, Guelzo argues that the South’s defeat at Gettysburg was in essence it’s “Waterloo moment”.

General Meade

General Meade

Victory at Gettysburg came despite the leadership of the timid and unremarkable General Meade. How did he accomplish the most famous victory of the war against a superior Robert E. Lee? The answer is that he had a group of tenacious subordinate Generals who pulled him away from his overcautious McClellan like tendencies. It was these unsung generals who uncompromisingly pushed forward to defeat Lee and save the Union.

Yet Guelzo’s analogy to Waterloo falls a little flat. He ends the talk with the comment “Waterloo? What’s Waterloo?”.

Well, it wasn’t Gettysburg thats for sure.

For one thing, had Napoleon won Waterloo, he would not of been able to force peace like Lee hoped to accomplish. Waterloo was the first in what would of been a series of desperate battles to retain Napoleon’s power. Unlike Lee, had Napoleon won the battle, he still had a million mustered soldiers to face. The Prussians and the Russians were coming, and there would be no singular smashing victory that would sway popular opinion and force peace. Napoleon did not have the luxury of fighting against a democracy in Europe.

Horatio GatesIf I were to humbly suggest a comparison to Gettysburg from an earlier historical battle, I would suggest Saratoga.

Like Meade, Horatio Gates managed to pull off a victory despite his caution and passivity. And it was Gates’ subordinate Generals that would ultimately gain the credit for victory. Benedict Arnold and Daniel Morgan’s dogged determination (with the help of the American Rifle) guided the Americans to victory.

The political and military consequences of Saratoga and Gettysburg were also similar. In both cases the enemy’s back had been broken.

In the case of the South, they would never mount an offensive campaign in the North again. The window to influence political opinion before the election had closed. Those in the North clamoring for peace and conciliation would take a back seat to the war hawks like Lincoln who demanded unconditional surrender.

For the British, the loss at Saratoga turned a small regional rebellion into a world war. The victory convinced France to formally ally with the Americans and declare open war with the British Empire. Not only did the loss eliminate a large British contingent in America, it also further diluted British resources in the region as they stretched their military across the globe to defend against the new French threat. At this point, the war in America almost became a second thought. Britain would never again be able to fully focus its military might against America.

In conclusion, i content Gettysburg’s significance had more in common with Saratoga than Waterloo. What was at stake was a military and political killing blow, not a last ditch defensive effort gone wrong. Where Guelzo suggests Lee and Napoleon on the losing end, I humbly counter with Meade and Gates on the victorious end.

Would love to hear others thoughts on this!

Myths of The Revolution Part 2: Guerrilla Tactics

09 Wednesday Oct 2013

Posted by in Strategy & Tactics

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When historians and enthusiasts look back on the American Revolution, very few would describe the war as an example of a conflict dominated by guerrilla tactics. To be sure, these tactics (much of which were borrowed from the Native Americans), were used effectively during the American Revolution. But at its core, the American Revolution was an 18th century war using tactics common to the European theater.

By the end of the war, most British units were converted to light troops that adopted looser formations to fit the wooded conditions

By the end of the war, most British units were converted to light troops that adopted looser formations to fit the wooded conditions

Despite modern misconceptions, 18th century tactics were flexible enough to adapt to the conditions of the battlefield. At no point did the British stubbornly hold on to antiquated ideas of warfare while Americans decimated their ranks with skirmish techniques and asymmetrical warfare. The British won most of their battles during the Revolution, and they did this by adapting to the environment like any elite army would be expected to do. British defeat would not lay at the hands of Patriot guerrilla irregulars, rather, it would lay at the feet of poor campaign strategy, French intervention, and a collection of British Generals that seemingly couldn’t coordinate a game of stick and hoop between a group of 5 year olds.

The Battle of King's Mountain. Essentially the end of any substantial Loyalist Support in the South

The Battle of King’s Mountain. Essentially the end of any substantial Loyalist Support in the South

George Washington and Nathaniel Greene certainly did not discourage attempts by militia to harass the enemy at every turn. During the Southern Campaign, Green must of realized the importance of local Patriot irregulars who harassed Cornwallis’ troops and worked to effectively stifle local support for the British cause. Patriot and Loyalist militia fought critical battles outside the view of British troops, and both sides brought to bear guerrilla tactics as they struggled for supremacy. Eventually the Patriots would come out on top (Thanks in large part to the Overmountain men and backcountry militia) and Cornwallis would be forced to see the writing on the wall—there would be no groundswell of British support substantial enough to hold conquered southern territories. He shifted his focus to chasing down Nathaniel Green’s army. This fateful decision would eventually led him to Yorktown.

Conclusion

As I studied tactics during the American Revolution, my opinion on guerrilla warfare gradually migrated from one of “almost nonexistent” to “somewhat helpful.” It is important to note the critical influence that Native American’s had on this military method. The ‘Indian style’ involved quick and deadly strikes by loosely grouped soldiers who disappeared into the wilderness as quickly as they came.

Hardened by these battles with Native Americans during frontier skirmishes and the French Indian war, men like the Overmountain men and other war hardened settlers took the lessons to heart and used these tactics to some effectiveness against the British.

Yet at its core the American Revolution was an 18th century war in which the critical battles employed tactics common for the day.

The French & Indians launch their attack on the British & American troops; Braddock falls shot while George Washington attempts to assist him.

The French & Indians launch their attack on the British & American troops;
Braddock falls shot while George Washington attempts to assist him.

As we look back from our 21st century perspective, we see no equivalent to the Tet offensive or any series of ambushes that totally annihilated British armies. The British would not expose themselves to defeats similar to those suffered during Braddock’s campaign during the French Indian war.

Indeed, when we look back we see a a war fought similarly to the war of 1812 than it was to Vietnam, Napoleons Peninsular campaign or the Russians in Afghanistan. The British were eventually brought to the peace table by larger engagements fought on relatively equal terms using conventional 18th century tactics— not by irregular warfare and guerrilla tactics.

Napoleon vs Washington: Strategy (Napoleon)

28 Sunday Apr 2013

Posted by in Napoleon Bonaparte, Strategy & Tactics

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napoleon-washingtonStrategy: A high level pan to achieve one or more goals under conditions of uncertainty.

For our discussion, we will narrow the ‘conditions of uncertainty’ to military objectives.  In the case of Napoleon, we will narrow the scope of our discussion even further to focus what is certainly one of the greatest strategic blunders of all time.

As General and Emperor, Napoleon accomplished a great deal during his reign. He restructured the French army, rewrote and consolidated the legal codes of the nations he conquered (hello unified Germany!) and attempted to solidify his power by inserting himself and his family into the fabric of European monarchy.

Napoleon’s modern army coupled with his logistical superiority made him almost unstoppable. As the European powers raced to catch up with the modern construct of Napoleon’s forces, alliance after alliance found itself repeatedly at the wrong side of the negotiating table.  As a result, peace negotiations ended with even higher tensions and more bad blood. European monarchy squirmed at the reality of being bowed by a talented but lowly usurper who came power on the heals of a revolution that decapitated a longstanding monarch.

In order to hold on to his power in this climate of mistrust and continual warfare, Napoleon’s political objectives inevitably influenced his military ones. In a final effort to end these repeated alliances formed against him, Napoleon set out for Moscow to deal with tsar Alexander who had turned his back once again on the French Empire.

Victorious over the Russian army, Napoleon waited in the burnt husk of Moscow convinced that the tsar of Russia would soon come to terms. But Napoleon failed to realize that the Russians were not playing by conventional 18th century codes of warfare. Theirs was a Total War. A Total War is fought by an entire population with little attention given to conventional codes of military and political conduct (the Russians even set fire to their own capital as they left). The Emperor expected the defeated enemy to reciprocate and surrender. This expectation would end in ruin as Alexander refused to play by the rules. Escaping to Petersburg, the tsar had essentially taken his ball and gone home.

If you are strictly a military man unencumbered by the obligations political negotiation, you pack up your army and leave Moscow before the winter comes. The safety of your men and effectiveness of your army comes first.  But if you are both the primary political figure AND military leader, things are more complicated. Napoleon stayed, waiting for a negotiation that never came.

A tragic mistake to be sure, but the decision itself did not doom Napoleon’s army entirely. When he finally decided to head home, he made another blunder almost as bad as the first. Napoleon’s army would return to France from the same direction from whence he came. This couldn’t of played into the hands of the Russians and their scorched earth policy any better.

napoleon_retreat_russiaNapoleon’s army deteriorated as it trekked through a wasteland of burnt fields, bloodthirsty partisans, and tracks of land covered by the frozen remains of battles fought earlier in the campaign. Napoleons loss of men, and (according to David Markham) his loss of horses ended his strategic dominance and subsequently his reign in Europe.

Why did Napoleon return by the same route? It was certainly a strategic decision in which you can’t point the finger at political obligations. It was a strategic blunder perhaps motivated by fear of the unknown. Were stronger armies south of Moscow waiting for him?

These two epic strategic decisions unfortunately overshadowed all of Napoleons strategic strengths. His strengths were many. He was adept at moving fast and meeting armies before they could combine to face him. The modern construct of his army, the strength of the Generals under him, and his brilliant use of artillery on the battlefield made him one of the greatest military commanders of all time. Yet his political obligations ended up contributing to one of the greatest strategic blunders of all time. This blunder will forever color the perception of Napoleon as the milistary strategist.

Up next, Washington’s strategic ability…

Questions for an Infantry Man (Part 2)

24 Sunday Feb 2013

Posted by in Infantry, Revolutionary War, Strategy & Tactics

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Part two of our Q&A session with Patrick O’Kelley.

SFC O'Kelley(mid)

How did infantry tactics evolve during the war?

The British realized, before the war started, that they would not be able to fight in America with their European tactics.  They went from three ranks (one kneeling) to two ranks, so that they could move faster.  I already mentioned that the British would move fast during a battle to close with the American army and push them away with the bayonet.  Many battles were over with in less than half an hour due to this.  Some battles there were only one or two shots fired, and then it was over.

The Americans went from an army that could not even deploy onto a battlefield in a short period of time, to one that was able to take on the British using the bayonet.  The Americans went from an army that had a large amount of civilian rifles in their ranks, to one that primarily used muskets and bayonets.

What are the differences between continental soldiers and militia?

Continentals were the full time soldiers.  They enlisted for two to three years and were usually issued uniforms.  They were the “regular” army and bore the brunt of the fighting.  Militia were part time soldiers… they were the farmers, shopkeepers and such.  You didn’t want to use them all the time because the country needed farmers and shopkeepers and such.  They were used for short periods of time and their main job was not on the battlefield, but were used to police the countryside.  They would guard depots, bridges, and do patrols to subdue or intimidate Loyalists.

When South Carolina fell and was occupied by the British, the militia became the partisans… the guerillas… and hit the British in their supply lines.  In the South, in battle, they were used to slow down the British army, so that the Continentals could finish off the British army.

What is an infantryman’s worse fear?

It doesn’t matter if it is a Legionnaire with Caesar, or a Ranger in Afghanistan, the worse fear is always the same.  It is not dying, though that is huge concern.  The biggest fear is to let down the men to your left and right or end up getting them killed for something you have done, or didn’t do.

What were the most renowned British and American regiments fielded during the Revolutionary war?

I could write several dozen pages on this question, since the war lasted eight years and covered the entire United States.  There were hundreds of Regiments that were here, both from the Regular army and the militia or provincials.

However let’s narrow it down to the most renowned Infantry regiments fighting in the South, since you have already covered the artillery and cavalry from other interviews. On the British side there were the Guards who were considered the elite of the British army.  No Guards regiment deployed over here, but volunteers came over and formed the Brigade of Guards, consisting of all three Guards Regiments.  There was also the 71st Highlander Regiment, and the 33rd Regiment.  All were renowned and when the Americans faced them, they knew they were going to put up a fight.

On the American side, in the South, there was Kirkwood’s Delaware’s.  This was the survivors of the Delaware line that had been wiped out at Camden and was in every single major battle afterwards. Also on the American side you had the 1st Maryland, who learned how to fight in the first battles of the war, honed that skill with von Steuben at Valley Forge, then used all their knowledge in the battles in the South.

The “Super Bowl” of the Revolutionary War was when the British Guards faced the 1st Maryland at Guilford Courthouse.  Both sides were equally deadly and experienced, and neither side budged.  It finally took massive losses to make both sides back away from each other and call it a day.

In your opinion, what battles illustrated the most effective use of infantry movement and tactics?

Cowpens.  The three line “defense in depth” worked so well that Greene used it in every single battle he fought afterwards.  Guilford Courthouse, Hobkirk’s Hill, and Eutaw Springs all use this three line tactic.  Add in the effective use of artillery and cavalry and the British would not be able to counter this tactic.  The only thing that saved the British army was the British soldier, who, by the end of the war, was a highly motivated, well trained and experienced combat veteran.

Twistification thanks Patrick O’Kelley

Patrick is currently a Junior ROTC instructor in Sanford, North Carolina at Lee County High School.  He is the author of the four volume series, “Nothing but Blood and Slaughter, the Revolutionary War in the Carolinas” and “Unwaried Patience and Fortitude, Francis Marion’s Orderly Book”.

Questions for a Infantry Man (Part 1)

18 Monday Feb 2013

Posted by in Cowpens, Infantry, Strategy & Tactics, Weapons of the Revolution

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Guilford 45 (NM)Patrick O’Kelley served 20 years in the military, retiring with the rank of Sergeant First Class. He was with the 82nd Airborne Division – the 3rd Ranger Battalion – F Company, 51st Long Range Surveillance Unit – 5th Special Forces Group and the 3rd Special Forces Group.

A sniper in the 82nd Airborne, O’Kelley served during the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and with the 5th Special Forces Group during Desert Storm in 1991.

Patrick has been reenacting the Revolutionary War since 1979 and has been in the same unit, the 2nd North Carolina Regiment, since that time.

I can’t imagine a more qualified person to answer a few humble questions from a Revolutionary War enthusiast. Thanks to Mr. O’Kelley for taking the time to sit down with Twistification!

What are some of the common troop types fielded by the Americans and British during the Revolution?

I’m assuming you mean what types of units were in the war.  The British army was not the “best army in the world” during the American Revolution, though many like to describe it as such.  However the British army was extremely adaptive and would change tactics, weapons and uniforms to fit the war they were in.  They remind me of the United States Army today.  A typical British Regiment consisted of several Regular Infantry Companies, one Light Infantry Company and one Grenadier Company.

In theory the Lights would move out in front of the main body and act as skirmishers, making the enemy deploy.  The Grenadiers were the “heavies” and were used as the assault force or the anchor.  The Regular companies would do the brunt work of the attack.

However theory went out the window when they fought in America.  British tactics were made for fighting in Europe, with wide open fields where artillery and cavalry could be used to their most effective.  America was not Europe and consisted of one giant forest stretching from Canada to Florida.  Not a lot of open fields and most battles happened on and around roads, since that was the only clear spot on the map. So when the British changed their tactics they basically made everyone Light Infantry.  The formations spread out in “open order” (greater distances between men) and the uniforms were modified for fast movement, such as round hats or shorter jackets.  The Light Infantry companies and the Grenadier companies banded together into Light Infantry and Grenadier brigades.

The American army started out with nothing.  No uniforms, no weapon factories, no navy, and not a lot of ammunition.  In the beginning no two units had the same drill and trying to get soldiers from one region to cooperate with those from another region seemed an impossible task.  Washington had to organize this ugly mob into some sort of a fighting force, all the while begging Congress to give him the basics and trying to appease dozens of officers who thought they should be in charge.

And when these two forces faced off, how did it go? 

In the beginning the American army could not take on the British, so they relied on a defensive strategy.  Bunker Hill worked tactically, so every battle seemed to be a version of that.  When Washington was able to defeat the Hessians at Trenton, he relied on this tactic to beat the British.  However the British are not the Hessians and when Washington tried to do a “Trenton” at Germantown, it cost him.

At Bunker Hill the British learned a deadly lesson.  If the Americans were entrenched, they would put up a vicious fight. The Americans could also shoot.  This was because a large part of the American army on that field had rifles, a weapon that the British were not used to in a military battle.  The rifle was a civilian weapon, but the American army was a civilian army.  The British soon learned that if you could close with the Americans, fast, they could not take on the British soldier armed with a bayonet and usually would retreat or run away in panic.

What saved the American army was von Steuben.  He showed them how to fight like the Prussian army, using columns to move into battle instead of Indian file, and he was able to get all working together on the same drill.  Add to that the influx of French arms and bayonets, and the “new” American army was finally able to take on the British at Monmouth using their own methods.

The American army was honed to their most effective when the war came to the South.  Greene used Morgan’s strategy of a “defense in depth” of not one line, but a series of lines that the British army had to break through.  Each line made the British lose men, ammunition and strength.  It would be like playing a football game with three offensive lines guarding the quarterback and not just one.  Though Greene didn’t trust the militia, he was able to use them to their best potential as a skirmish line to slow down the British before engaging the main line of Continentals.

To be continued…

Twistification thanks Patrick O’Kelley

Patrick is currently a Junior ROTC instructor in Sanford, North Carolina at Lee County High School.  He is the author of the four volume series, “Nothing but Blood and Slaughter, the Revolutionary War in the Carolinas” and “Unwaried Patience and Fortitude, Francis Marion’s Orderly Book”.

The Battle of Cowpens

06 Sunday Jan 2013

Posted by in Daniel Morgan, Revolutionary War, Strategy & Tactics, The battle of Cowpens, Weapons of the Revolution

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small_the-battle-of-cowpens-sc-1781As the 232nd anniversary of the battle of Cowpens approaches, I picked up a copy of A Devil of a Whipping, the Battle of Cowpens. It was an easy read with some interesting info. Here are a few points:

  • During the Revolution, muskets were called firelocks because they generated their own fire, hence the later term firearm.
  • Both sides increased musket lethality, if not accuracy, by issuing buck and ball cartridges containing one large ball and at least three smaller (.30 caliber) balls.
  • By 1871 both sides deployed rapidly, (abandoning the slow, steady approach march) by closing the distance as quickly as possible, often with sizable gaps between men. This change in tactics was a response to American rifle fire and British artillery.
  • British artillerist John Muller recommended ricochet firing because it saved powder and was more dangerous. After the first ricochet, a ball might bounce another 400 yards and still injure men waiting in reserve.
  • American General Daniel Morgan issued a password and countersign ‘Who are you?’ Answer ‘Fire.’ Reply, ‘Sword.’ Similarly, D-Day’s password and countersign was ‘Flash.’ Reply, ‘Thunder.’
  • Sentries on horseback were called ‘videttes’

Next week I’ll post some tidbits about the battle itself. After that I’ll post photos and video from the anniversary celebration. I hope to make a few contacts that would be willing to guest post.

 

The Art of the Siege

08 Saturday Dec 2012

Posted by in Revolutionary War, Strategy & Tactics

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YrktnSieges are ugly affairs, but during the late 18th Century sieges had developed a formal methodology thanks to a French soldier by the name of Sebastian le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707). Up until his arrival, sieges were chaotic events in which attackers suffered heavy losses while haphazardly digging trenches toward a well defended wall.

Sebastian conceived of a rather simple method (aren’t all innovations wonderfully simple?) of meticulously approaching an enemy wall by digging a series of well placed trenches while protecting the men who dug the trenches. Those who failed to protect themselves were, well…’poor saps‘.

By using de Vaban’s methods, the art of the siege became so well entrenched (ha! see what I did there?) that executing a siege became a ritualized affair set with formal rules and customs. This fell in line perfectly in a age of limited warfare. Vauban’s method’s were so effective that once a siege began, there was little hope for the defender outside of the appearance of a reinforcing army.

Such was the case for Charleston in 1780. The British launched their ill advised Southern Campaign and unfortunately for South Carolina, Charleston was their first stop. De Vauban’s technique was used successfully during the siege and Charleston was taken.

‘The Road to Guilford Courthouse‘ by John Buchanan has a wonderful description of the siege that includes colorful characters on both sides including a brilliant Jäger commander by the name of Johan von Ewald, a brutish British Admiral and a man that led up the American defense who suffered from narcolepsy. The book is excellent!